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rn THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)

-v-

REX GLEN FOUST,

No. 15786

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 76-5-406
(1953), AS AMENDED, WHEN READ IN CONNECTION WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 76-7-102 (1953), AS AMENDED,
CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT THE AGE AT
WHICH A PERSON IS DEEMED LEGALLY CAPABLE
OF CONSENTING TO AN ACT OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, AND THEREFORE INCEST, IS FOURTEEN
YEARS OF AGE, FOR BOTH MALES AND FEMALES.
A.

THE RESPONDENT SIDESTEPS THE
CURRENT LAW IN THE STATE OF
UTAH BY SUGGESTING TO THIS
COURT THAT A REPEALED STATUTE
RESOLVES THE ISSUE PRESENTED
IN THE INSTAHT CASE AS TO THE
AGE OF CONSENT.

The respondent submits in its brief that a
repealed statute is controlling in the instant case.

Utah

Code Annotated, Section 76-53-19 (1953), repealed, and a few
cases decided thereunder are cited by the respondent as
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authority for the proposition that a female must be eighteen
years of age before she is deemed legally capable of consenting
to an act of illicit sexual intercourse.

In citing this re-

pealed statute, the respondent sidesteps the current law and,
specifically, Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-406 (1953), as amended,
which states in relevant part as follows:
An act of sexual intercourse
. . . is without consent of the
victim under any of the following circumstances:
(7)
The victim is under
fourteen years of age.
(Emphasis added.)

There can be no doubt as to the meaning of § 76-5-406
and its overruling effect on § 76-53-19:

a person, whether

male or female, over the age of fourteen years, is deemed
legally capable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse.
The age of fourteen years, set forth as the age of
consent in the above statute, reflects the considered opinion
of the Legislature and is consistent with the statutory determination that the age of fourteen years is the age of criminal
responsibility, as set out in Utah Code Annotated

§

76-2-301

(1953), as amended.
In the instant case, the criminal offense of incest
has been charged against the appellant.
§

Utah Code Annotated

76-7-102 (1953), as amended, sets forth the crime of incest

as follows:
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A person is guilty of incest when
he has sexual intercourse with a
person whom he knows to be an
ancestor, descendant, brother,
sister, uncle, aunt, nephew,
niece or first cousin.
(Emphasis
added.)
Since consent is not a defense to the crime of incest, no language as to the age of consent appears in the
incest statute.

Nevertheless, the issue of consent can be, as

it is in the instant case, important as an evidentiary matter.
The actus reus of incest, as set forth in the above
statute, is the act of sexual intercourse.

As stated earlier,

Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-406(7) expressly provides that a
person is deemed legally capable of consenting to an act of
sexual intercourse when he or she reaches the age of fourteen
years.
In the instant case, the complaining witness was
sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense of
incest and, therefore, legally capable of consenting to the
actus reus of the crime, sexual intercourse.

The complaining

witness' testimony indicates that she did in fact consent to
the act of sexual intercourse :and, in so doing, aided in the
corrnnission of the crime of incest.
As stated in appellant's original brief, the complaining witness' act of consenting makes her an accomplice
to the commission of the crime.

As a result of being an
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accomplice to the crime of incest, whether or not formal
charges are brought against her, the complaining witness'
testimony must be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction of the appellant.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE LAW AS TO THE AGE OF CONSENT, WHICH ERRONEOUSLY LIMITS
THE APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, SECTION 76-5-406(7)
(1953), AS AMENDED, TO MALES
OVER THE AGE OF FOURTEEN AND
FEMALES OVER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN,
IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 2 AND 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The issue as to whether discrimination between sexes
based on age is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment has most recently been decided
in the state of Utah in the case of Stanton v. Stanton, 517
P.2d 1010 (Utah 1974).

In that case, supplementary proceed-

ings were brought by the divorced wife to recover child support
payments accruing after the daughter reached eighteen years of
age.

The defendant argued that under the divorce decree he

was only required to make support payments to his daughter
until she reached the age of majority and that under Utah Code
Annotated§ 15-2-1 (1953), a female reaches the age of majority at the age of eighteen.

The plaintiff contended that the
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statute, extending the period of minority in males to the age
of twenty-one years and in females to only eighteen years,
denied equal protection of the laws.
The Utah Supreme Court held that said statute was
constitutional and stated:
There is no doubt that the
questioned statute treats men
and women differently, but
people may be treated differently so long as there is a
reasonable basis for the
classification, which is related to the purposes of the
act, and it applies equally
and uniformly to all persons
within the class. 517 P.2d
at 1012 (emphasis added).
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 43 L. Ed. 2d 688, 95 S. Ct.
1373, rejected the Utah Supreme Court's reasoning and held
that there was no reasonable basis for the discriminatory
classification.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the

decision and held that the Utah statute was a denial of equal
protection under the law.

The United States Supreme Court

stated:
. . . there is nothing rational
in the statutory distinction
between males and females, which
when related to the divorce
decree, results in appellee's
liability for support for the
daughter only to age 18, but for
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the son to age 21, thus imposing
'criteria wholl! unrelated to
the objective o that statute.'
421 U.S. 7, 43 L. Ed. at 691,
95 S. Ct. 1373 (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court relied heavily on
its earlier decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 L. Ed.U
225, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971).

That case presented an equal pro-

tection challenge to a provision of the Idaho Probate Code
which gave preference to males over females when persons,
otherwise of the same entitlement, applied for appointment as
administrator of a decedent's estate.

The Court held that

this provision of the probate code violated the equal protection clause.
A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrar~, and must
rest on some groun of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.
(Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, counsel for the appellant made
a motion to dismiss the complaint based on insufficient evidence.

Counsel argued that the complaining witness consented

to the alleged sexual offense and was therefore an accomplice
to the act so that her testimony would have to be corroborated
in order to sustain a conviction.

The trial court denied

said motion and stated, "Eighteen and over is an accomplice,
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by the statute."

(Tr. 19, 20.)

It is unclear to which statute the trial judge was
referring.

Appellant has been unable to uncover a statute,

under the modern laws of the State of Utah, which supports
this conclusion.

Since Utah Code Annotated§ 76-5-406 (1953),

as amended, is the only statute speaking to the age of consent for offenses involving the act of illicit sexual intercourse, it must be concluded that the trial court was interpreting said statute.
§

The trial court's interpretation of

76-5-406 must meet the test established by the United States

Supreme Court in Reed, supra, and reiterated in Stanton,
supra:

Discrimination between sexes based on age "must not

be arbitrary, and must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation."

404 U.S. at 75-76.

It is the appellant's contention that to hold that
a female must be eighteen years of age before she is legally
capable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse, where
a male of only fourteen years is legally capable of consenting
to the same act and could be charged as an accomplice, is an
arbitrary classification in violation of Reed, supra, and the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Distinguishing criminal culpability as between
sexes based on age has been declared unconstitutional in
numerous jurisdictions.

In Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-7-OCR, may contain errors.

Cir. 1972), Danny Lamb, then 17 years of age, was tried as an
adult under 10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1101 for the crime of burglary of an automobile, a felony under Oklahoma law.

Lamb

argued that he should have been proceeded against as a juvenile in juvenile court.

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit held:
Oklahoma statute allowing females
under the age of 18 the benefits
of juvenile court proceedings
while limiting the same benefits
to males under the age of 16 violated the equal protection clause.
456 F.2d at 18.
The court further stated:
The general doctrine is that the
Fourteenth Amendment, in respect
to the administration of criminal
justice, requires that no different degree or higher punishment
shall be imposed on one than is
imposed on all for like offenses
. . . . 456 F.2d at 20 (emphasis
added).
This decision was upheld in Radcliff v. Anderson,
509 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1974) and was applied retroactively.
This same issue was brought before the court in
Ex Parte Mathews, 438 S. W. 2d 438 (1973).

The court declared

that a statute providing for inclusion of females at age 17
within a definition of the word "child," while not including
males of the same age, and providing for original jurisdiction
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of juvenile court over offenses committed by males under 17
years of age and females under 18 years of age was unconstitutional.

The court stated:
. . . we are unable to find any
rational objective or logical
constitutional justification for
the disparity in the age classification between seventeeneighteen year old males and
seventeen-eighteen year old females. 488 S.W.2d at 438 (emphasis added).
The court in People v. Ellis, 293 N.E. 2d 189 (1973)

reached the same conclusion holding that:
The statutory provision here
under review is clearly a denial
of equal protection based upon
a classification by the state
on account of sex and the same
is invalid and unconstitutional.
293 N.E.2d at 193.
The court reasoned that to deny a male minor the
protection of juvenile court proceedings and grant such protection to a female defendant similarly situated amounted to
a denial of equal protection.
It has been clearly established that there is no
rational basis for distinguishing criminal culpability between
sexes based on age.

Therefore, there is no reasonable justi-

fication to support the trial court's conclusion that a 16
year old female, as a matter of law, cannot be held as an
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accomplice to a sex crime, when under Utah law a male of the
same age could be held criminally culpable.

Such a classifi-

cation, based on gender, is therefore "arbitrary" and invalid.

This arbitrary classification would allow the male
to be criminally convicted and punished while keeping a female
similarly situated i=une from any criminal proceedings.

As

established in Lamb, supra, "no different degree or higher
punishment shall be imposed on one than is imposed on all for
like offenses .

"

Since in the present case, the trial

court held that the complaining witness could not be criminal:::
prosecuted, but under Utah law a male similarly circumstanced
could have been criminally punished, this would clearly be a
denial of equal protection under the laws, as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The law as to the age of consent is clear.

Under

Section 76-2-301, Utah Code Annotated (1953), a person is
criminally culpable for his conduct at the age of 14 years.
Section 76-5-406, Utah

Cod~

Annotated (1953) provides that a

person over 14 years of age is deemed capable of consenting
to the act of sexual intercourse.

Under Section 76-7-102,

Utah Code Annotated (1953), sexual intercourse is the actus
reus for the act of incest.
In the instant case, the complaining witness was
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well over the age of criminal culpability.
consented to the act.

She admittedly

She was therefore an accomplice to

the alleged crime so that her testimony would have to be
corroborated to sustain a conviction.

In the absence of

corroborating evidence, it was error for the trial court to
deny counsel's motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
grounds of insufficient evidence.
The trial court's interpretation of the Utah law
as to consent denies equal protection under the law.

The

trial judge's conclusion would protect a female 16 years of
age who knowingly and voluntarily consented to the act of
sexual intercourse from being prosecuted as an accomplice.
However, a male of the same age, similarly situated, could
be criminally prosecuted and punished as an accomplice.
There is no doubt that such an application of the law is a
violation of equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Wherefore, the appellant respectfully prays that
his conviction be reversed or, in the alternative, that this
court reverse and remand this case for a new trial with an
instruction to the trial court that the jury must be instructed on the applicable law with regard to the age of
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consent and accomplices and the need for corroboration in
order to sustain the conviction of the appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
H.AJ.\TSEN AND HANSEN
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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